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Abstract
This article contributes to the debates around concepts of truth, confession, 
forgiveness and reconciliation. The theoretical discussion shows to what 
extent these concepts are interconnected, and share a complex relation 
with justice and reconciliation. It argues that the knowledge about past 
violence is hardly a canonical truth. It is at best a negotiated truth. 
This knowledge is inevitably a combination of facts and interpretations. 
This knowledge is sought and used for understanding past violence 
but also for paving a way towards the reconstruction of post-conf lict 
societies. The article argues that confession offers a twofold opportunity: 
it produces knowledge of past violence, and acknowledgement of victims’ 
pain through perpetrators’ expression of remorse, although in a limited 
manner. Forgiveness is also discussed in relation to its essential meaning, 
the actors involved, and its purposes. Finally, reconciliation is built on two 
pillars, firstly, the proclamation of a seemingly achieved reconciliation; 
and secondly, the experiencing of reconciliation in everyday interaction 
between perpetrators and victims.
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Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, post-conf lict reconstruction processes 
around the world have focused on three main interrelated mechanisms. 
The first dealt with the promotion of peace. The second dealt with conf lict. 
The third ones have been formulated or articulated around what is 
called transitional justice, which includes legal justice and social justice. 
This third category also includes consideration of memory, truth, healing, 
human rights protection, reparation, and reconciliation, to name a few 
(Fisher et al. 2000; Oberschall 2007; Mason and Meernik 2006; Francis 
2008; Malan 2008). 
My focus is on the concepts which appear in the third category. Many of 
these concepts, such as justice, truth, confession, forgiveness, and 
reconciliation have been explored by social scientists for academic and social 
benefits. But their formulations have always faced obstacles stemming from 
the impossibility to wholly capture the object of study they are analysing, 
or the social reality they are trying to document and understand. On 
the one hand, these concepts are studied by social scientists of different 
disciplines, such as social science, anthropology, psychology, philosophy, 
history and political science, who happen to use different methodologies 
and approaches. This produces multiple interpretations of those concepts 
and their theories. On the other hand, post-conf lict countries where these 
transitional justice mechanisms are being implemented have different 
histories, different violence backgrounds, and therefore, will have 
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different ways of using those mechanisms in order to maximise success. 
This prompts me to ref lect upon those concepts once again, with the view 
of using them in my fieldwork research on how testimonies about past 
violence contributed to the reconciliation process in Rwanda.  
In their entirety, to what extent do testimonies of truth and confession 
lead to forgiveness and reconciliation in post-conf lict situations? How are 
these truths and confessions collected and used? What are their narrative 
formats and problems? How can and should reconciliation be experienced 
in everyday life? This article might consider its method as philosophical, 
as it grapples with these main questions, examining and evaluating views 
and discussions found in the existing literature. This article revisits the 
concepts of truth, confession, forgiveness, reconciliation and everyday 
interaction between perpetrators and victims after a protracted and violent 
conf lict, with an aim to understand their intricate complexities at semantic, 
theoretical and empirical levels. It will attempt to separate, delineate and 
problematise these concepts, thus opening them up to analysis. 
This article contributes to the debates around concepts of truth, confession, 
forgiveness and reconciliation. It argues that the knowledge about past 
violence, often referred to as ‘truth’, is hardly a canonical truth. It is a 
complex mixture of plausible truths, resulting from a negotiation process. 
This knowledge is also a combination of facts and interpretations. It is 
sought and used for understanding past violence but also for paving a 
way towards the reconstruction of post-conf lict societies. Confession, for 
instance, does not only produce knowledge of past violence but also, when 
perpetrators express remorse, acknowledgement of victims’ pain. And 
forgiveness is discussed in relation to its meaning and the actors involved, 
but also with a view to its purposes. Finally, the article argues that 
reconciliation is built on two pillars, its proclamation and its experiencing 




The negotiation of ‘Truth’
As far as reconciliation is concerned, the idea of truth has been idealised 
from the time when truth commissions became the centre-stage for 
addressing traumatic violent pasts. When truth commissions then 
documented traumatic pasts, the revealed knowledge justified their 
existence. But these truth commissions have in turn to be created. 
In most cases, it is post-conf lict governments that are in charge of this task. 
The truth commissions usually work with civil society organisations 
where these are available and active or willing to participate in the process. 
International agents also get involved in the process to support efforts 
of post-conf lict states’ leaderships and civil society organisations in this 
regard. Truth commission members come from state, civil society and 
sometimes even from international actors. Thus, the creation of truth 
commissions is itself a negotiated process.
The decision over what past to uncover depends on the events, the time 
and actions that the above actors consider as more important. Again those 
actors may converge or diverge over choices to be made. The final decision 
will depend on the balance of power that the state, the civil society or the 
international organisations hold in this respect. It may also come from a 
compromise between them. The best scenario would be when a consensus 
decision is reached. 
The naming of the body in charge of collecting this past is also not done 
in the vacuum. It has its own history. It comes from what happened in 
the concerned country, what needs to be remembered in the present, and 
what use is expected from the knowledge of that violent past experience. 
Many commissions have been about truth and reconciliation, others about 
truth, justice and reconciliation, still others about national unity and 
reconciliation. Many have favoured some kind of restorative justice, others 
some combination of restorative with retributive justice, others with the 
collection of truth only. A few have included dialogue.
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Since much is at stake in revealing what happened, leaders and commission 
members have devised several methods to instil witnesses – perpetrators, 
victims, and others – to narrate their experiences. These methods include 
laws, incentives or conditions, such as judicial amnesty, reduction of 
punishment for perpetrators, confidentiality, security and even material 
incentives. In most cases, these measures are implemented gradually to 
instil more participation (Whittaker 1999; Ndahinda and Muleefu 2012).
As far as perpetrators are concerned, instilling them to testify, that is, to 
confess their crimes, has been very difficult. The first widespread response 
of the perpetrators to this truth-uncovering process has been to hide the 
truth, i.e., their responsibility in the past violence. The second has been 
to distort that truth. In this regard, denial of genocide or crimes against 
humanity has been one of the reactions of perpetrators in many cases. 
Another reaction has been to produce outright lies. In fact, few perpetrators 
have been ready to reveal their role as well as what they knew about 
the violence.
These instilling measures have tried as much as possible to establish 
favourable conditions that would enable perpetrators to feel secure and 
assured enough to reveal what they knew and what they had done. These 
measures have been implemented in many post-conf lict cases, but differed 
from case to case and from epoch to epoch. What happened in Chile differed 
from what was implemented in Argentina, in South Africa, in Sierra Leone 
or even in Rwanda. Such measures also differed from one epoch to another 
within a case: severe punishment at the beginning, a softer one later or 
even the opposite (Hazan 2010; Ndahinda and Muleefu 2012). 
The Rwandan Gacaca for example adopted a policy of reducing sentences for 
those perpetrators who would confess their crimes and show remorse. This 
however went hand in hand with the concern about the sincerity of some 
confessions, given the fact that perpetrators would just confess in order to 
have their punishment softened (Longman 2006). Moreover, the Rwandan 
and South African cases have revealed that the first perpetrators who testify 
become a reference for others to do so. This creates some kind of imitation 
70
Charles Mulinda Kabwete
effect. A testifying chain is created, where those who testify influence others 
to do so, up to the point when events, unfoldings and actions of violence gain 
more explanation or light (Rutayisire 2013b; Minow 1998). This negotiation 
for truth for amnesty or reduced sentence has not always applied to all 
perpetrators. For example, perpetrators of excessive crimes in South Africa, 
Côte d’Ivoire and Rwanda were not granted such opportunities (Minow 
1998; Labelle and Trudel 2012; Swaak-Goldman 2001).
The truth-probing processes are at the heart of the relation between 
justice and truth. For example, we see the offering of amnesty for truth 
in the South African case (Roht-Arriaza 2006). The existence of tribunals 
and truth commissions also exemplifies this justice-truth tandem. They 
provide retributive and restorative types of justice and constitute an 
archive of past violence. This archive becomes at the same time truth for 
justice and truth for historical knowledge. Roht-Arriaza (2006:6) argued 
that international tribunals are repositories of past crimes records. This 
author further argued for the complementarity of truth and prosecutions 
(Roht-Arriaza 2006:8). 
Most importantly, the core mission of transitional justice is to provide both 
truth and justice in the post-conf lict context:
Transitional justice involves prosecuting perpetrators, revealing the truth 
about past crimes, providing victims with reparations, reforming abusive 
institutions and promoting reconciliation. This requires a comprehensive 
set of strategies that must deal with the events of the past but also look 
to the future in order to prevent a recurrence of conflict and abuse 
(Van Zyl 2005:209).
In the same vein, Teitel (2000:72) offers the way trials help produce this 
truth-telling process:  
Trials are long-standing ceremonial forms of collective history making. 
But beyond this, trials are the primary way of processing events in 
controversy. The ordinary criminal trial’s purposes are both to adjudi-
cate individual responsibility and to establish the truth about an event 
in controversy.
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In the view of Futamura and Stan, international tribunals do not only 
produce history in the sense of recording narratives of past violence, but 
also become historical events themselves, that is, they make history by 
prosecuting high profile perpetrators (Futamura 2008:45; Stan 2009:2). 
Having perpetrators officially named and acknowledge their crimes leads 
to some appeasement of victims (Sriram 2004), who realise that this past is 
not only known, but also managed. ‘The need “to deal with the past”, which 
is often expressed through commemoration, is increasingly considered 
to be crucial for transitional justice since an engagement with past 
violence is considered necessary for reconciliation and a peaceful future’ 
(Wittlinger 2018:4).
Once in place, then, truth commissions undertake their job, which 
is to reconstruct events of the past with a view to reaching different 
objectives, such as reconciliation, justice or peace. As far as post-conf lict 
reconstruction is concerned, this truth-probing process with perpetrators 
is productive, because it enables victims to learn about how their family 
members were killed, where they were buried or put, and who their killers 
were. This is expected to bring as much as possible ‘a fuller picture of the 
past’. It also helps to build a collective memory about what happened in the 
past, thereby creating a shared belief and understanding of past violences, 
and reducing lies or denials about them (Minow 1998; Gibson 2004).
However, for those who want or wish canonical truth, these commissions 
can be disappointing, because they are spaces for negotiation of truths, 
what in the South African case Martha Minow called ‘trade of truth for 
punishment’ (1998:56 and 129) and Pierre Hazan ‘transactions’ (2010:34). 
Uncovering enough or ‘total’ truth may not be possible in the present 
time. Nevertheless, in the future new conditions and new questions on 
remembrance can create a space for additional testimonies (Minow 1998). 
The experience of the memorialisation of the Armenian genocide has 
revealed to what extent different generations of survivors needed different 
memories, but also posed different questions to uncover what happened in 
1915–1923 against their family members (Fourcade 2007). If the written 
records preserve ‘cases’ which ‘stand in the historical record forever’ 
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(Hamber 2009:144), it would be a mistake to think that they are fixed. 
Their interpretation will surely vary according to audiences and will keep 
on evolving in different epochs.
The collection of truth
The findings of the collection of truth by truth commissions appear 
in the final reports that they produce at the end of their mandate. 
The collection phase brings together commission teams (commission 
leaders, researchers, technicians, and assistants) with the witnesses. 
In this regard, the commission team acts as the audience or mediator for 
the perpetrator who comes to testify. In other cases, the commission team 
meets with both perpetrators and victims who testify together in a group. 
In still other cases, a wider audience gathered from the local population is 
also invited or even requested to participate. Certain gatherings are even 
broadcast on television, such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC). These sessions are called hearings. From such hearings, 
the reconciliation process is expected to begin (Schabas 2006).
The testimonies that truth commissions collect on violent events of the 
past are never full, complete nor enough. Not all witnesses are contacted, 
sensitised and prepared to give testimonies. Also not all witnesses are 
approached by the commission, even when they want to (Hayner 2011). 
Moreover, ‘truth’ depends on the politics of its collection but also the 
feasibility or the possibility of collecting it (Wilson 2001). This justifies the 
fact that after commissions’ reports in different post-conf lict countries, 
researchers must continue to collect more testimonies, analyse them, 
write their histories, and evaluate their usefulness in reconciliation or for 
other outcomes. 
In addition to fact finding, interpretation of those facts is needed, in order 
to make intelligible the ‘fragments of the past’ (Minow 1998:120). This 
is close to what Phil Clark (2010:34–35), analysing the Rwandan Gacaca, 
called ‘truth-shaping’, i.e., the agency of national leaders, local judges, and 
witnesses in the reconstruction of what happened during the genocide 
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against the Tutsi. Further, he makes a distinction between ‘legal truth’ and 
‘therapeutic truth’, i.e., ‘“truth” told for more personal, emotional reasons’ 
(Clark 2010:186–187). Clark’s point makes it clear that those who narrate 
these past violent memories do two things at the same time: they narrate 
them, but also interpret them. Depending on types of past offences, and 
actors seeking truth and reconciliation in the South African TRC, multiple 
truths were targeted: factual or forensic truth, personal or narrative truth, 
social truth, and healing and restorative truth (Wilson 2001). 
Thus, facts combined with their interpretations are needed. A proper 
methodology of collecting those facts of the past must be designed, but 
also interpretive approaches must be conceived. It is interpretation that 
will help identify gaps, silences and even caveats from available data 
(Hayner 2011; Burrell 2013). This interpretation – or reinterpretation – 
is fundamental, because the ideology that legitimised past violence was 
also an interpretation of the past. Thus, the reinterpretation of this past 
after the violence serves to contradict the perpetrators’ ideologies and to 
reconstruct a collective memory that will heal society in present and future 
(Dimitrijević 2006).
The uses of truth
The reconstruction of the history of past violence helps delegitimise past 
violence and injustices. It does so by unpacking and deconstructing past 
ideologies of genocide and other violence, hence discouraging those who 
would support them again. Above all, it challenges denial and distortions 
of that past. It also stands as a justification for paying reparations to victims 
of past violence (Minow 1998; Hayner 2011). 
The collection of truth about past violence also preserves memory. Many 
authors advocate extreme caution in the collection and use of perpetrators’ 
testimonies. For example, Christopher Browning who has analysed 
the Holocaust has suggested that Adolf Eichmann’s testimony be taken 
seriously. While several other authors rejected it as mere self-defence in 
court, Browning focused on details provided by Eichmann which might not 
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be known otherwise. He concluded that though we must remain sceptical 
on the content of perpetrators’ testimonies, there can be something new 
to learn from them and which is not available elsewhere (Browning 2003). 
The survivors’ testimonies are also criticised for the trauma imprint they 
carry. Since the memory of survivors is disturbed by the trauma of past 
violence, as it is posited, their recollection of the past events, actions and 
violence is not always congruent. Browning suggests again to look at this 
testimony differently: ‘The “authenticity” of the survivor accounts is 
more important than their “factual accuracy”. Indeed, to intrude upon 
the survivors’ testimonies with such a banal or mundane concern seems 
irrelevant and even insensitive and disrespectful’ (Browning 2003:38).
The collection of this memory is for knowledge production but also 
acknowledgement; fact-finding about the past but also healing in the 
present (Schabas 2006; Gready 2011). This memory is about past violence, 
but also about how this violence is viewed in the present and how it can 
and must be prevented in the future (Villa-Vicencio 2004). This process 
requires the presence of the witness testifying and the audience before 
which he/she is testifying. Then an interaction ritual of speaking and 
listening will be initiated, where perpetrators confess their crimes and 
society members actively receive and assess them. This is the main mandate 
of truth commissions (Humphrey 2002). This interaction ritual also 
provides a space for future reconciliation between the perpetrator and his/
her self, but also between him/her and the rest of the society (Schaap 2005). 
Moreover, this audience is not just a requirement, it is also an asset. Indeed, 
by having the whole country and community listening to the witness, he/
she feels that his/her experience is shared, that he/she is not an isolated 
wrongdoer or martyr (Minow 1998). 
Truth seeking also aims at restoring justice (Longman 2006; Hayner 2011). 
It again aims at reconciliation. Perhaps this is why many commissions are 
called truth and reconciliation commissions. However, we must distinguish 
between individual reconciliation and social reconciliation (Bloomfield 
et al. 2003). 
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In the same vein as truth commissions, some historians have positioned 
themselves – or offered their scholarship – for the benefit of reconciliation. 
They have correctly shown how their discipline – with its intricate methods 
and techniques – can constitute a useful tool for reconstruction of past 
violence, or a past ideology of hate, and then inform society about it and 
about ways of preparing for reconciliation (Barkan 2005). In this regard, 
historians and others who produce historical works, in their role of public 
intellectuals, will be an added value to truth commissions and tribunals 
(Barkan 2009). That history is useful as a tool for fostering truth and 
ascertaining whether reconciliation is attainable. However, how to teach 
history for reconciliation is what sometimes poses practical challenges 
(Pingel 2008). One such attempt has been to produce – and where it is 
available – to promote a shared history, i.e., a shared understanding of past 
violence. This attempt has been a necessary step for reconciliation, as is 
shown in the case of Rwanda (Staub 2008).
Finally, psychologists assert that truth becomes the starting point for 
‘healing, forgiving and reconciliation’. With truth in hand, the victims’ 
victimhood and innocence are ascertained. It also reveals why perpetrators 
should accept and express their guilt (Staub and Pearlman 2002:217–218).
Confession
While truth telling or the collection of accounts tends to come from all 
witnesses of past violence, confession is expected to come from perpetrators 
or those who were responsible for the violence. The perpetrators’ accounts 
are important for the reconstruction of history or for healing as we saw 
above. They are also about acknowledgement of guilt through providing 
information about one’s crimes.
There are a number of problems that are enumerated in the literature 
about the confession activity itself. Firstly, the language to describe past 
violence is heavy; so there is some tendency to soften it, hence reducing the 
veracity of the content of the confession itself. The complexity of naming 
violence by perpetrators has prompted some of them to use metaphors in 
order to veil their atrocious acts in the past. This happened in Northern 
Ireland’s reconciliation confessions. The words and representation used by 
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Pat Magee, the perpetrator, soften, and even conceal the violence of the 
bombing he was involved in (Cameron 2007:208–210). But is it possible to 
describe past violence in the exact words? And what words would be capable 
of depicting – i.e., resurrecting the exact image of – extreme violence, say of 
genocide or crime against humanity? 
Secondly, there can be a problem where a post-conf lict state has put in 
place a confession framework such as truth commissions or the gacaca 
jurisdiction in Rwanda. When some perpetrators come forward to confess 
their crimes, their sincere apologies acknowledge victims’ victimhood or 
suffering and at the same time paves the way for victims to see perpetrators 
once again as humans. But how can the sincerity of apology be assessed? 
(Barkan and Karn 2006). 
As argued by Leigh A. Payne (2008:2), ‘Rather than apologize for their 
acts, perpetrators tend to rationalize them and minimize their own 
responsibility, thus heightening, rather than lessening, tension over the 
past’. The realist view from Payne suggests that perpetrators will not tell 
the whole truth about past atrocities in order to protect themselves. They 
may also be motivated to confess their crimes for the benefit of healing 
their own trauma from past violence, and at the same time reduce their 
punishment in an impending trial. 
Moreover, the perpetrators’ technique of contextualising past violence may 
trivialise confession and constitute a euphemism for the guilt. Such, for 
example, is the case of Captain Alfredo Astiz who explained his violent 
role in crimes against humanity in Argentina as purely resulting from his 
military duty (Payne 2008:75). Conversely, the perpetrator Duch from 
Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge refused to put the blame on the leadership and 
acknowledged and confessed his own crimes as head of a prison that killed 
hundreds of opponents (Curvellier 2011:3 and 41).
A close scrutiny of case studies suggests that confession testimonies always 
come with a twofold reality: they offer insights about the past violence 
– sometimes accompanied with remorse from perpetrators, sometimes not – 
but they do not tell the whole truth.
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In East Timor, perpetrators called deponents were given the opportunity to 
confess their crimes as a condition to be reintegrated into the community 
after the violence. They had to appear before the Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation and before the community members 
that they wronged, and were expected to confess their crimes and apologise. 
Some victims felt convinced enough to forgive those who confessed their 
crimes, but others required more truth and remorse from deponents. 
And deponents did not always provide this. But whatever the case, victims 
who opposed the state’s process of confession and reconciliation lacked 
the right ‘not to reconcile’ (Larke 2009:666–667). 
In Rwanda, a history of confessions and apologies of genocide prisoners 
points out that massive apologies from prisoners started at Rilima in 
the rural part of Kigali as early as 1998. After that, more prisons were 
sensitised so that prisoners would confess their crimes and narrate details 
of the unfolding genocide and their responsibility in it. Many did so and 
as a result, very important information on the victims who were killed 
and their killers was made available. This information enabled the court 
to identify more perpetrators from those who were then in prison but also 
others who were outside (Rutayisire 2013a). However, many who confessed 
their crimes did not show enough remorse. So the quality of confession 
became problematic (Rutayisire 2013a and b). 
The gacaca phase of collection of testimonies relied on ‘confessions, 
guilt pleas, repentance and apologies from the persons who participated 
in genocide’ (Rwanda 2004). Some of the information were pure lies, 
half-truths, or even fabrications. At times, silences hampered efforts at 
collecting truth. In most cases, half-truths were about minimising their 
own crimes (Rutayisire 2013c). 
Thirdly, if confessions come with the expression of remorse, they are 
believed to bring about reconciliation. However, it is necessary to emphasise 
the audience that records these confessions. Is it the truth commissions, 
churches, civil societies or is it individual encounters between the 
perpetrator and the victim who was wronged? What forms of forgiveness 





So what is forgiveness, and how is it produced, manifested and used for 
reconciliation purposes? First, forgiveness is defined from a rational 
point of view. In this regard, forgiveness is an effort of redefinition of the 
perpetrator by the victim: ‘… the forgiving person [is the one who can] 
“see the offender in a more complex way”’ (Quoted in Worthington 
2006:21). Forgiveness can also be defined as the antithesis of vengeance: 
‘Reaching for a response far from vengeance, many people, from diverse 
religious traditions, call for forgiveness. The victim should not seek revenge 
and become a new victimizer but instead should forgive the offender and 
end the cycle of offence’ (Minow 1998:14). As far as rational choice is 
concerned, Minow argues that there are individual and social benefits to 
gain from forgiving. She rejects cheap forgiveness: ‘Perhaps forgiveness 
should be reserved, as a concept and a practice, to instances where there 
are good reasons to forgive. To forgive without a good reason is to accept 
the violation and devaluation of the self ’ (Minow 1998:17). 
Secondly, since forgiveness is also a matter of the heart, it is defined from 
an emotional point of view: ‘Emotional forgiveness occurs due to replacing 
negative, unforgiving stressful emotions with positive, other-oriented 
emotions’ (Worthington 2006:17). 
Concerning the production and manifestations of forgiveness, Worthington 
proposes two types of forgiveness, intrapersonal and interpersonal. 
‘The intrapersonal component can ref lect either an internal forgiveness 
or a lack of it. The interpersonal component involves the expression of 
forgiveness to the person toward whom one is unforgiving. The victim 
could either express or not express forgiveness’ (Worthington 2006:18). 
Interpersonal forgiveness has four possibilities: 
In the first possibility … the person is simply unforgiving …. However, if 
the person feels forgiveness toward the transgressor but does not say so, 
silent forgiveness has occurred .… If the victim does not feel forgiving 
but tells the transgressor he or she is forgiving, this is hollow forgiveness. 
Hollow forgiveness is given when victims feel that the social norms require 
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forgiveness. It can be the most costly to the victim .… In full forgiveness, 
internal forgiveness is expressed to the perpetrator. Both victims and 
perpetrator benefit (Worthington 2006:18). 
Political forgiveness or simply forgiveness is given by the victim to the 
perpetrator – sometimes as a response to apology. But this does not mean 
that forgiveness is conditional. Forgiveness is a free gift of the victim to the 
perpetrator. It is not released as a result of any bargain with the perpetrator. 
This is so because apology or confession does not help the victim regain 
his/her prior life condition, i.e., the state the victim was in before being 
harmed. Which means that the victim remains always on the losing side 
as far as past loss is concerned (Schaap 2005; Volf 2002). But forgiving 
the perpetrator does not mean necessarily accepting him/her: ‘Forgiveness 
should therefore not be confused with acceptance of the other .… To offer 
forgiveness is at the same time to condemn the deed and accuse the doer; 
to receive forgiveness is at the same time to admit to the deed and accept 
the blame’ (Volf 2002:45). It may mean tolerating him/her.
Among the goals of forgiveness there is also reconciliation. The victims 
forgive the perpetrators so that they can live harmoniously together again. 
Forgiveness is accorded by the victims, but reconciliation is produced by 
both the victims and perpetrators, often with the help of a mediator such as 
the state or any other agents (See Staub 2006). But it is also possible to forgive 
without planning to live side by side with the perpetrator. So forgiveness 
does not always lead to reconciliation (Clark 2010). Reconciliation also 
includes forgiveness and has many other aspects (Worthington 2002). 
Reconciliation
Reconciliation means different things to different people who want to 
reconcile (Verdoolaege 2008). This difference of meanings of reconciliation 
is understandable and therefore not surprising (Schaap 2005). Broadly 
speaking, reconciliation is a peaceful and amicable relationship that 
occurs between – and is built by – perpetrators and victims after a 
conf lict. This relationship is both rational and emotional (Auerbach 2009). 
One possibility of its occurrence is through the willingness of the 
perpetrators to confess their crimes to victims and society and receive 
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forgiveness from them. They see each other as human once again and 
learn to trust each other (Bar-Tal 2000; Worthington 2006). In the best 
condition, reconciliation is produced through confession by perpetrators 
and forgiveness by victims and society at large. 
Proclamation of reconciliation
In ideal situations, once the perpetrators confess their crimes and the victims 
positively welcome their confessions and forgive them, a reconciliation 
process can be initiated. And after a certain level of interaction between 
the opposing groups has been attained, they can proclaim to be reconciled.
Louis Kriesberg’s aspects of reconciliation help us to understand some of 
the requirements for the proclamation of reconciliation. He firstly speaks of 
antagonistic units, what I would call agents, i.e., those who reconcile. These 
include the individuals and the groups or nations – ordinary citizens and 
elites. The proclamation and the success of reconciliation will depend on 
the willingness of these agents (Kriesberg 2007:2–3). He secondly elaborates 
on what he calls dimensions of reconciliation (Kriesberg 2007:3–7). 
These include: 1) a shared truth about the violent past, 2) justice (legal and 
social), 3) respect (expressed through remorse, guilt, regret, and shame), 
and 4) security (here understood as absence of threat from each group). 
In a best scenario, these components can be fulfilled in combination. 
His third aspect is the degree of fulfilment. The greater the fulfilment, the 
more successful the outcome of achieved reconciliation outcome may be.
The actions of reconciliation include ‘restoring friendship and harmony 
between rival sides after a conf lict’ and attaining ‘an act of conf lict 
resolution, but also an emotional process of changing the motivations, 
beliefs, attitudes and emotions inferred about the rival side’ (Bekerman 
and Zembylas 2012:57). The actions of the perpetrator include confessing 
his/her wrongs, acknowledging the victimhood of the survivor and 
sympathising with him/her (Schaap 2005). By so doing, the perpetrator 
may be forgiven by the survivor and may then be brought back to his/ 
her community. 
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Reconciliation is close to restorative justice in the sense that the latter also 
intends ‘to repair the harm, heal the victims and community, and restore 
offenders to a healthy relationship with the community’ (Tiemessen 
2004:60). According to Labelle and Trudel (2012), reconciliation is a 
component of transitional justice. As far as this justice is concerned, the 
South African Ubuntu implies guilt plea, remorse, repentance, forgiveness 
and reparation for reconciliation (Brock-Utne 2009). The Rwandan gacaca 
also relied on the collection of confessions, guilt pleas, repentances and 
apologies (Rutayisire 2013a).
Reconciliation should be understood to include both the process of 
reaching it and its achievement (Bekerman and Zembylas 2012). But it 
does not end with an apparent achievement such as the publication of 
TRC reports; that is rather where it begins (Nagy 2004). It would be a 
fallacy to think that proclamation of reconciliation is enough for agents to 
have reconciled. This is a necessary step, but by no means a sufficient one 
(Long and Brecke 2003). The proof of reconciliation will come from the 
way the former perpetrators and victims live together in present time and 
in future.
Experiencing reconciliation 
We need first to identify the agents who interact in this process of 
reconciliation. Personal reconciliation is within the individual him/
herself. Interpersonal reconciliation is among two individuals, the victim 
and the perpetrator. These two types of reconciliation are in the domain of 
the private sphere. Political reconciliation on the other hand is among two 
previously antagonistic groups or communities. Some authors call it social 
reconciliation (Kohen et al. 2011).
Secondly, we need to stress the relational process between the agents. 
As Lederach rightly pointed out, reconciliation is first and foremost about 
the relation. ‘To enter reconciliation processes is to enter the domain of the 
internal world, the inner understandings, fears and hopes, perceptions and 
interpretations of the relationship itself ’ (Lederach 2002:195). So the key 
word here is ‘between’. It is this relation that I call interaction.
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Stages of reconciliation help us to understand negative and positive 
interaction. When the state has built enough of a peaceful environment to 
enable non-violent coexistence (Mendeloff 2004), this would be referred 
to as negative interaction or first-step interaction. After bringing a relative 
peace and security and building institutions necessary for the functioning 
of the state, a possibility of coexistence is established between former 
perpetrators and victims. In this way, and ideally, perpetrators are unable 
to continue the killing process against victims, and victims cannot take 
revenge on their perpetrators. 
Interaction occurs during the negotiation for reconciliation between the 
victim and the perpetrator. When facts of the past are being narrated by the 
perpetrator to the victim, when confession is taking place, and is possibly 
followed by forgiveness, this is already the first step interaction (Kohen 
et al. 2011). This paves the way for future durable interaction, i.e., the 
possibility and the experience of living together in harmony. This durable 
interaction is both a process and an end. The perpetrator and victim have 
to nurture it on a daily basis. However, such a process takes a long time, 
often more than one generation, in order to succeed (Hazan 2010). 
The second step is that of a deeper coexistence, expressed or manifested 
through a relation of trust and recognition of humanity between the victim 
and the offender. The third stage is empathy. This involves truth-telling, 
sharing common interests including economic benefits (Bloomfield et al. 
2003). Trust and empathy are needed in the first encounter, but need to be 
strengthened in the course of living together (Staub 2006). Trust appears 
as a basic necessity for individual and group interaction, for sharing hopes, 
goals and social life (Buford 2009; National Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission [NURC] 2008). 
When trust has been destroyed by conf lict, how does it become revived? 
It is argued that mutual commitment and patience among those who 
reconcile are crucial in order to make a joint sacrifice of self-interest 
(Lederach 2002). This post-conf lict interaction needs to be as friendly and 
as amicable as possible (Bar-Tal 2009). Rachel Back (2007) gives an example 
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of South African women victims whose children were killed by apartheid 
leaders in 1986. These women founded an association called Mamelodi 
10 Project and decided to meet with the white men who had killed their 
children. The contact, here called ‘encounter’, showed the willingness and 
sacrifice, but also the difficulty of reconciliation. In addition to humanity, 
humility is also needed. This highly religious concept and reality enables 
the perpetrators, victims and truth commission members to tolerate each 
other in this lifelong process. 
As far as process and progress of reconciliation are concerned, individuals 
and communities need not have the same pace of positive interaction. 
The most important thing is to have the preconditions of ‘truth’ for the 
past, justice for the present, forgiveness and peace for the future met, as 
much as possible (Lederach 2002). 
Staub (2006:887) argues that ‘… genuine engagement … must exist for 
contact to work. Joint activities, with shared, “superordinate” goals, facilitate 
such contact’. Research by Ezechiel Sentama indicates that collaboration 
by former perpetrators and survivors of genocide in cooperative economic 
activities has enabled both groups to improve their economic situation. 
Most importantly, working together helped them to overcome negative 
feelings of ‘fear, anger and hatred’ and replace them with convivial 
relations, positive communication and peaceful collaboration both inside 
a cooperative working environment and also in the social sphere (Sentama 
2009:90–132).
Indeed, economic associations encompassing both perpetrators and 
victims started to operate in Rwanda very early. By 2001, the National 
Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) was financially helping 
more than 60 of them. In this regard, unity and reconciliation was in 
tandem with the economic well-being of members (Nantulya et al. 2005). 
No wonder the NURC’s definition of unity and reconciliation links them 
with development. That is why we have associations and cooperatives of 
interaction which focus not just on reconciliation but also on economic 
progress (NURC 2010). 
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The case of interaction between South Africans of different races shows that 
income was significant. Those with a high income tended to socialise more 
than those of lower income position (Du Toit 2017). So the economic factor 
is significant in the reconciliation process. Indeed, the improvement of 
socio-economic conditions has proved more important in paving the way to 
reconciliation between communities as is seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Eastmond 2010). In relation to trust and interaction, another concept is 
used. It is social cohesion, both vertical and horizontal (NURC 2008:28–29). 
In my research, I am more concerned with horizontal interaction, i.e., the 
interaction between perpetrators and victims as individuals in everyday 
life. Maddison (2017) used the concept ‘relational reconciliation’ to refer 
to this horizontal interaction. Furthermore, the creation of reconciliation 
clubs in schools by the Rwandan NURC was in line with both interpersonal 
and social reconciliation (Nantulya et al. 2005).
In Rwanda, interpersonal reconciliation has also been undertaken by 
Churches. Both lay members and clergy have been active in sensitising 
perpetrators to confess their crimes and victims to forgive them. A few 
examples from the Roman Catholic churches mention two women from 
the Tutsi victims who initiated campaigns of going to prisons to talk with 
genocide perpetrators. These women, Anne-Marie Mukankuranga and 
Consolee Munyensanga, created prayer groups that ended up becoming 
avenues for reconciliation between local victims and perpetrators. A priest 
from the Roman Catholic Church, Ubald Rugirangoga, initiated expiation 
rituals and sessions of theological teachings that united victims and 
perpetrators with the aim of obtaining reconciliation between them. From 
these actions, it transpired that confession, forgiveness and reconciliation 
were seen as God’s rule and gift (Carney 2015).
A few other cases illustrate the centrality of trust and dialogue in the 
post-conf lict interaction process. The case of reconciliation in Northern 
Ireland addresses intergroup relations in which trust is seen as successful 
when the decision to engage in dialogue is voluntary (Tam et al. 2009). 
The following factors helped evaluate the degree of the reconciliation 
process between Germany and Israel: trust, history and common interests 
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(Wittlinger 2018). The case of coexistence between former antagonists in 
Bosnia shows to what extent reconciliation is a gradual process. It goes 
from geographical closeness to an open social interaction (Clark 2012). The 
case of Kosovo and Serb communities shows how lack of trust has impeded 
the reconciliation process between them (Burema 2012). As Noor and 
others (2015:647) argue, ‘In the absence of trust, even conciliatory gestures 
by the perpetrator group are likely to be interpreted as manipulative ploys’.
Conclusion
This theoretical discussion around the concepts of truth, confession, 
forgiveness, and reconciliation after conf lict has showed to what extent 
these concepts are interconnected. We saw that those who seek truth 
have to pass through a negotiation process or something that looks like 
a negotiation. Those who narrate this truth, recall past events but also 
interpret and even reinterpret them. This whole exercise can be seen as an 
attempt to contextualise the collection of truth but also to problematise it. 
Truth in most cases is plural, not singular. Again, the fact that the whole 
truth is ever rare may be disappointing, but actors may hope to get more 
truth with time. Our above discussion of confession also points to a number 
of other problems. First, the form and the substance of confessions matter. 
Second, the techniques used by perpetrators in their confession language 
tend to conceal or reduce their responsibility in past violence. We saw also 
that forgiveness by victims is evoked from confession by perpetrators, but 
it can also be given unconditionally. Reconciliation is presented as the 
outcome from truth, confession and forgiveness. But it also goes beyond 
these, to mean the process itself. Finally, reconciliation firstly manifests 
as a proclamation by the victims, perpetrators and other actors that have 
reconciled, and secondly manifests in their experience of living together 
harmoniously. As we explained above, these two requirements need more 
time than is mandated for truth and reconciliation commissions.
Both transitional justice and reconciliation have proved to be at least 
useful and at best unavoidable policies for post-conf lict situations. 
This article concludes with a strong recommendation that the meanings of 
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these concepts must be clearly understood. These meanings are not only 
semantic or cognitive, they are also contextual. That is, the way a given 
society or country will shape and then implement a transitional justice or 
a reconciliation process will depend on how it understands justice, truth, 
confession, forgiveness and reconciliation, and what it needs, given its 
history and current situation. The worst scenario would be to use them in 
the same way other countries or societies have implemented them without 
adapting them to own contexts. One possible avenue that has proved 
successful has been to relate these policies and mechanisms to home- 
grown solutions.
The implications for this reformulation are threefold. First, as this article 
has shown, there is no single and agreed understanding of the concepts 
of truth, confession, forgiveness and reconciliation to address all post-
conf lict situations. Second, the analysis of new cases of violence may 
require a separate as well as a combined examination of the above concepts. 
Third, any meaningful reformulation must consider negotiation processes, 
cognitive and emotional aspects, and judicial, moral, social and material 
benefits in post-conf lict solutions.
Finally, some key questions need to be addressed. What are the institutions 
of transitional justice and reconciliation that are suitable in a given post-
conf lict situation in order to deal with the issues of truth, confession, 
forgiveness and reconciliation? Will they be: commissions or tribunals or 
both or anything else? Who will be the agents of this process? What content 
of past violence will be gathered? How will it be gathered? How will it 
contribute to building a peaceful interaction between former perpetrators 
and victims? What activities will be carried out in a short or medium or 
long term? When will the evaluation of the process take place?
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